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“What Does Russia Want?”
Investigating the Interrelationship between Moscow’s Domestic 
and Foreign Policy
by Igor Torbakov
Moscow’s increasingly assertive behavior has given rise to intensive speculation as to 
what the ultimate goals of  Russia’s foreign policy are. Basically, the question that needs 
to be answered is: What does Russia want?
I would argue that it is impossible to understand the logic of  Russia’s international con-
duct without investigating the intimate and intricate link between the country’s domestic 
politics and its foreign policy. The intent thus is to place a special emphasis on studying 
how the nature of  Russia’s socio-political system influences Moscow’s policies in the 
international arena.
I start off  with postulating a thesis that, ultimately, the goal of  Russian foreign policy 
efforts is to create conditions for preserving and perpetuating the current political and 
economic regime, while seeking to attain its legitimation by the international commu-
nity. Specifically, this means that the Kremlin’s three-pronged objective is: to secure the 
persistence of  a system of  authoritarian rule and of  bureaucratic capitalism; to have 
this system recognized as valid in its own right—being equal (or even superior) to the 
Western liberal model; and to integrate Russian economy into the global system while 
shielding the domestic policies from the “pernicious” outside influences.
My second thesis is that it is precisely the nature of  Russia’s socio-political system that 
makes Moscow’s policies both towards the West and its ex-Soviet neighbors within the 
common neighborhood inconsistent and contradictory. Since the specific characteristics 
of  Russia’s regime make integration with Western/EU institutions all but impossible, 
the Kremlin leadership proclaims Russia’s strategic independence.
The intent to cast Russia as an independent pole inevitably compels the Kremlin leader-
ship to focus on the country’s immediate strategic neighborhood—what has famously been 
called the sphere of  Russia’s “privileged interests”—where Russia seeks leadership and 
closer integration. But paradoxically, the seeming affinity between the authoritarian regime 
in Russia and those in most East European countries appears to be the main factor prevent-
ing successful integration. The thing is that authoritarian power simply cannot be delegated.
This explains why Russia ends up being faced with the seemingly intractable attraction-
assertion dilemma. Being unable to integrate its neighbors, Russia seeks to aggressively 
assert itself  and its interests. But Moscow’s increasingly muscular policies seem to con-
tradict Russia’s stated intention to attract allies and cast itself  as an appealing socio-eco-
nomic model to be emulated by the like-minded partners.
Summary
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»Was möchte Russland?«
Untersuchung der Wechselbeziehung zwischen Moskaus 
Innen- und Außenpolitik
von Igor Torbakov
Russlands zunehmend bestimmendes Verhalten hat Spekulationen über die ultimativen 
Ziele russischer Außenpolitik befeuert. Grundsätzlich sollte in diesem Zusammenhang 
die Frage beantwortet werden: Was möchte Russland? Dafür muss unbedingt die enge 
und komplizierten Verbindung zwischen der Innen- und Außenpolitik des Landes 
untersucht werden. Ziel ist es deshalb, einen besonderen Schwerpunkt auf  die Frage zu 
legen, wie das Wesen des russischen sozio-politischen Systems Moskaus Politik gegenü-
ber dem internationalen Umfeld beeinflusst.
Ich beginne mit der These, dass die Anstrengungen russischer Außenpolitik letztendlich 
dem Ziel dienen, das bestehende politische und ökonomische Regime aufrechtzuerhal-
ten und zu schützen, wobei die internationale Gemeinschaft dieses Regime auch noch 
legitimieren soll. Im Besonderen heißt das, dass der Kreml drei Ziele hat: Sicherung des 
Fortbestehens eines Systems autoritärer Herrschaft und eines bürokratischen Kapita-
lismus; Anerkennung dieses Systems als gültig aus eigenem Recht – gleichwertig (oder 
gar überlegen) zum westlich-liberalen Modell; und Integration der russischen Wirtschaft 
in die Weltwirtschaft mit Abschirmung der Innenpolitik von »schädlichen« äußeren 
Einflüssen.
Meine zweite These lautet, dass gerade dieses russische sozio-politische System Moskaus 
Politik gegenüber dem Westen und seinen postsowjetischen Nachbarn unbeständig und 
gegensätzlich macht. Da die besondere Charakteristik des russischen Regimes eine Inte-
gration mit westlichen und EU-Institutionen fast ausschließt, verkündet das Land seine 
strategische Unabhängigkeit. Die Absicht, Russland als unabhängigen Pol zu präsentie-
ren, zwingt die Kremlführung dazu, sich auf  die unmittelbare Nachbarschaft zu kon-
zentrieren – was bekanntlich als Sphäre russischer »privilegierter Interessen« bezeichnet 
wird. In dieser Region strebt Russland einen Führungsanspruch und enge Integration 
an. Paradoxerweise scheint die scheinbare Geistesverwandtschaft zwischen dem auto-
ritären Regime in Russland und denen in den meisten osteuropäischen Ländern das 
Haupthindernis für eine erfolgreiche Integration zu sein.
Dieser Zusammenhang erklärt, warum Russland letztendlich einem unlösbaren Anreiz-
Behauptungsdilemma gegenübersteht. Indem es unfähig ist, seine Nachbarn zu integrie-
ren, versucht Russland aggressiv sich selbst und seine Interessen durchzusetzen. Jedoch 
scheint Moskaus zunehmendes Muskelspiel seinem erklärten Ziel zu widersprechen, 
Verbündete zu gewinnen und sich selbst als ein attraktives sozio-ökonomisches Modell, 
das von den gleichgesinnten Partnern nachgeahmt wird, zu präsentieren. Aus diesem 
Grund wird Russland in seiner Nachbarschaft als Raufbold wahrgenommen, gegen den 
man antreten muss, statt als wohlmeinender Anführer.
Zusammenfassung
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Over the past decade, Russia got back on its feet 
after the period of  humiliating weakness in the 
1990s and sought to reassert itself  as a Great Power 
in post-Soviet Eurasia. Simultaneously, its post-
communist socio-political system that emerged 
from under the rubble of  the Soviet collapse 
seemed to have reached maturity. These devel-
opments gave rise to the assertions that we are 
witnessing the reemergence of  Russian habitual—
some even say, Soviet-like—patterns: authoritarian 
politics, state-dominated economics, and the sense 
of  strategic autonomy which, in their turn, affect 
how the elites define and pursue Russia’s “national 
interests.” Indeed, what is the relationship between 
Russia’s domestic situation and its foreign policy? 
I would argue that this crucial linkage is still inad-
equately understood. Thus, looking into the nature 
of  present-day Russia’s regime type and analyz-
ing it within a broad historical context becomes 
absolutely essential to make sense of  continuities 
and discontinuities in post-Soviet Russia’s behavior. 
My own understanding of  Russia’s socio-political 
trajectory is informed by the notions of  “back-
wardness,” “path dependency,” “service-class revo-
lution,” “patrimonial rule,” “neo-feudalism,” and 
“resource state,” advanced and developed in the 
works of  Alexander Gerschenkron, Richard Hellie, 
Stefan Hedlund, Dmitry Furman, Simon Kordon-
sky, and Jack Snyder.1
The detailed analysis of  the present-day Russian 
socio-political system is of  course beyond the 
scope of  this paper. Several crucial things, though, 
need to be pointed out. Arguably, Russian history 
is best understood as the process of  adaptation 
to (relative) backwardness and perceived external 
threats. Historically, the pervading sense of  back-
wardness vis-à-vis the “developed West” seems to 
have been (and remain) one of  the key elements 
of  Russian self-understanding. “We cannot deceive 
ourselves any longer,” the liberal-minded Grand 
Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich was lamenting 
about the sorry state the imperial Russia had found 
itself  in the 19th century. “…We are both weaker 
and poorer than the first-class powers, and further-
more poorer not only in material but also in mental 
resources, especially in matters of  administration.”2 
Under completely different geopolitical circum-
stances, when Soviet Russia was in fact casting 
itself  as the vanguard of  progressive humankind, 
Josef  Stalin, who had just launched his “Great 
Break,” seemed to eerily echo the Russian royal’s 
apprehension. “We are fifty or a hundred years 
behind the advanced countries,” he famously said. 
“We must make good this lag in ten years. Either 
we do it or they crush us.”3 In the immediate after-
math of  the 2004 Beslan debacle, President Vladi-
mir Putin bemoaned the Russian leadership’s inabil-
ity to adequately assess and react to the numerous 
external and internal threats. Instead, he said, “we 
displayed weakness. And the weak are beaten.”4
In a vast, economically poor and sparsely populated 
country with porous borders, this sense of  inse-
curity and vulnerability has inevitably led, over the 
past half-millennium, to the practice of  mobiliza-
tion of  all available resources for the purpose of  
combatting (real or perceived) foreign threats. The 
ever-present need to be at the ready and mobilize 
all natural and human resources structured Russian 
society (both pre-revolutionary and Soviet) into 
castes all serving what some scholars call the “gar-
rison state.” Some castes would, naturally, be “more 
equal than others”—the privileged position of  the 
service class (nobility, bureaucracy or party nomen-
klatura) would be the main driver behind the elite’s 
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striving to legitimize and perpetuate their rule. As a 
result, Russia’s pattern of  development would take 
on the form of  alternating cycles of  reform and 
stagnation (or those of  “service-class revolution” 
and its subsequent degeneration).
Remarkably, such a pattern of  adaptation to back-
wardness and perceived threats appeared to be 
a source of  the perennial conflict with the more 
advanced Western states. “This was not because 
Russia was an exceptionally aggressive state com-
pared to the other Great Powers,” Jack Snyder 
perceptively explains. “It was because the distinctive 
nature of  Russia’s power, institutions, and ideolo-
gies, arising from the pattern of  late development, 
created a situation in which Russia and the West 
seemed inherently threatening to each other.”5
Making Sense of Russia’s Post-
Soviet Trajectory: the End of 
“Russian transition”
After the Soviet Union’s disintegration and the 
“really existing socialism’s” collapse, the opportu-
nity seemed to appear for Russia to finally break 
out of  the previous almost 500 year-long pattern 
of  development. Russia’s new rulers embraced 
the democratic rhetoric and set about—so they 
claimed—to build in Russia the Western-like politi-
cal system based on the rule of  law and liberal 
market democracy. At the time, the Russian elite’s 
intention to “catch up with the West through direct 
emulation” seemed only natural: there appeared to 
be no other viable ideology and social model—the 
Western-style liberal democracy was the only game 
in town. For its part, the West, too, was very enthu-
siastic about and supportive of  Russia’s initial post-
communist transformation. The thing is, however, 
that due to historical legacy Russia (and most other 
ex-Soviet nations for that matter) couldn’t build 
the Western-style polity and economics. Neither 
the country’s elites nor the public were prepared—
either culturally, or intellectually or psychologi-
cally—to pull off  such a feat. Ultimately, institu-
tional deficit trumped wishful thinking. It quickly 
became clear that a properly functioning legal 
system, the property rights’ protection, a vibrant 
civil society, political parties cannot just pop up (or 
be hastily created) simply because they are urgently 
needed. For its part, the West, truth be told, wasn’t 
nearly as helpful as the grandiose scale of  Russia’s 
transformation demanded. As a result, post-Soviet 
Russia, basically left to its own devices, was again 
confronted with the dilemmas of  backwardness.
Under the circumstances, the only feasible way 
to deal with this problem was the one dictated 
by the logic of  path dependency: after the initial 
chaotic “transformation period” (1990s), the elites, 
invoking the need of  “stabilization,” habitually 
opted for more centralization, larger role of  the 
state in economic sphere, and stricter control over 
political life. Thus, notwithstanding the official 
rhetoric asserting Russia’s European normality, a 
different kind of  system emerged and matured in 
Russia—distinct from both the old Soviet com-
munism and the Western liberal democracy. In 
all three key “transition areas”—transitions from 
command economy to free market, from authori-
tarianism to liberal democracy, and from imperial 
entity to nation-state—Russia has demonstrated a 
rather dubious record, which, overall, represents 
quite a mixed bag. It does have a market economy 
(which is, to be sure, no small achievement in 
itself), but its economic system isn’t fully free; in 
contrast to the Soviet times, its society is open, 
but its political system is closed and remains 
largely authoritarian; and it still finds itself  in the 
midst of  post-imperial readjustment, struggling to 
define the notion of  “Russianness” and forge a 
nation-state. Against this background, then, in the 
long-term perspective, Russia seems to remain a 
“transition society”—in a sense that such type of  
authoritarian regime, as Max Weber pointed out, 
is inherently unstable and thus, in the longue durée, 
ultimately unsustainable.
But in the short- to medium-term, given the strong 
vested interests in preserving the status quo, the 
“Russian transition” has ended: post-Soviet Russia 
is a sui generis entity with its own logic of  opera-
tion and development. Its socio-political system 
appears to be (relatively) stable so far, and its life 
cycle hasn’t run full course yet, although, arguably, 
Russia’s political regime has already entered the 
phase of  decline.
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Regime type and ensuing policy 
contradictions
While differing substantially from the liberal West-
ern model, the Russian authoritarian system con-
tinues to make use of  democratic rhetoric and of  
quasi-democratic procedures to legitimize its rule. 
This aspect of  the system’s workings is of  principal 
importance. To be sure, “democratic” procedures, 
norms and institutions are employed as a camou-
flage to cover up the patently undemocratic sys-
tem of  power. But, unlike other, more traditional 
authoritarian regimes such as absolute monarchies 
or military dictatorships, the present-day Russian 
political system doesn’t rely on either the ancient 
monarchical tradition or the army’s brute force. It 
is, according to one astute observer’s characteristic, 
an “electoral autocracy”6—a personalized regime 
with a strong domestic base. Thus “phony democ-
racy” is an absolutely indispensable element of  the 
post-Soviet Russian polity.
This deeply dichotomous nature of  the current 
Russian regime—with its central contradiction 
between authoritarian ways and pseudo-demo-
cratic phraseology—is clearly reflected in Mos-
cow’s international behavior which also appears 
to be contradictory and inconsistent. While its 
seeming adherence to democratic values is sup-
posed to call for an ever closer alliance between 
Russia and the West, the undemocratic nature 
of  the country’s socio-political system forces the 
elites to make sure that the Western impact on 
Russia’s domestic order and on the way it does 
business is minimal. Yet, there are also limits to 
Russia’s ability to defy the Western countries or 
pursue the openly anti-Western policies. Unlike 
the defunct Soviet Union, today’s Russia is not an 
ideological state. In fact, it doesn’t have any ideol-
ogy of  its own and is wary (for good reasons) to 
use Russian nationalism as a source of  ideological 
legitimation. This compels the Russian elites to 
present their country as a specific kind of  democ-
racy—to be accepted in the world’s prestigious 
international clubs such as G8. External recogni-
tion by the peers amongst the advanced indus-
trialized democracies and domestic legitimacy 
appear to be closely intertwined and inter-depen-
dent: as elections in Russia are increasingly being 
viewed as a sham, the elite’s desire to get the 
country’s social system recognized by the lead-
ing Western partners as basically falling within a 
democratic norm seems to intensify. At the same 
time, being recognized as a democracy is a sine 
qua non for obtaining a pass into the international 
society’s “supreme league.” The need of  legitima-
tion by the West acts as a certain restraint on the 
Russian regime.
Some political scientists call this regime, quite aptly, 
a “patrimonial authoritarianism,”7 noting that it is 
based both in its political and economic spheres 
not so much on the formal rules and institutions 
as on the informal patronage networks. Notably, 
it is the re(emergence) of  the system of  personal 
dependence and clienteles within the relations of  
power in Russia that prompted a number of  schol-
ars to talk about the revival of  certain archaic prac-
tices that, in the aggregate, can be characterized 
as “neo-feudalism.”8 They point to the new promi-
nence of  the “service class” in Russian political sys-
tem, the establishment of  the rigid social hierarchy 
made of  “estates” and corporations which hinder 
social mobility, as well as the conditional character 
of  property which is being constantly re-divided, 
re-distributed and often simply taken away by raw 
force.
One paradox of  the Russian “neo-feudalism” is 
that this system (which historically served the 
mobilization purposes in order to “catch up” with 
the more advanced and potentially threatening 
neighbors) has re-emerged at a time when the elites 
appeared to have given up any development strate-
gies based on mobilization. Thus we are witnessing 
a glaring contradiction: there exists a privileged 
“service class” (a “new Russian nobility,” in the 
words of  the Chairman of  the Russian Security 
Council, Gen. Nikolai Patrushev), but there is no 
“service class revolution” that would give a new 
spurt to the country’s development (like the ones 
in the 15th–16th centuries, Peter the Great’s or 
Stalin’s) on the horizon. Yet this is actually what 
“patrimonial authoritarianism” is all about: this 
regime type is just a means the ruling elites use for 
their self-preservation. It is utterly useless for any 
kind of  modernization policies—either mobiliza-
tion-based or innovation-based.
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The persistence of the resource 
state
There is one important function, however, that 
the ruling elite continue to perform—as it did in 
all previous historical incarnations of  the Russian 
state—and that is the mobilization and manage-
ment of  resources. The thing is, persuasively argues 
the sociologist Simon Kordonsky, that what the 
standard textbooks normally call “economics,” 
within the Russian context is better to character-
ize as the “resource-based organization of  social 
life.”9 The upshot is that throughout most of  its 
modern history Russia had what can be termed a 
“resource state.” The main objectives of  such type 
of  state have been and remain the mobilization and 
management of  resources which are not regarded 
as mere commodities and whose true value isn’t 
expressed in monetary form. Ideally, Kordonsky 
contends, mobilization of  resources means that 
the state would have a nearly total control of, and 
manage, all material and human flows. One funda-
mental consequence of  this state of  things is that, 
historically, Russia’s administrative-territorial system, 
industrial structure and social organization were 
in fact derivative from the process of  exploration, 
extraction, accumulation, distribution and con-
sumption of  resources. Resource states give rise to 
what the political economists Daron Acemoglu and 
James Robinson call the “extractive institutions.”10 
The ruling elites in the countries where the acting 
norms and laws protect the property rights of  the 
privileged minority and discriminate against the 
majority of  the population use the state’s “monop-
oly on violence” to line their pockets, redistribute 
property and perpetuate their privileged status. 
Extractive political and economic institutions are 
mutually reinforcing: those who have all advantages 
usually end up having also all the resources needed 
for the preservation of  their power. In Russia, the 
country richly endowed with natural resources, the 
“extractive” regime rests upon the extractive indus-
tries: Russian abundance in hydrocarbons encour-
ages the elites to establish control and hold on to 
what effectively is a symbiosis of  political power 
and economic wealth.
Indeed, the current structure of  the Russian elite 
neatly reflects the prominence of  what is locally 
known as the “fuel and energy complex.” Oil and 
gas sector as well as finances are viewed by the 
ruling elites as the “commanding heights” and 
lifeblood of  national economy which is best to 
keep under the state supervision and control. This 
situation leads to a notable contradiction pertain-
ing to the sphere of  foreign relations. On the one 
hand, Russia’s energy companies are interested in 
cooperation with whomever they can strike most 
lucrative bargains—which, of  course, mostly means 
the Western partners. Yet on the other hand, these 
companies are run by the representatives of  the 
elite who have the closest ties with Russia’s state 
bureaucracy, are most dependent on, and subservi-
ent to it. They are basically intertwined with the 
current regime and hell-bent on preserving the sta-
tus quo, thus perpetuating the polity that makes Rus-
sia a kind of  odd man out vis-à-vis the West and 
presents an obstacle to a genuine rapprochement 
between Moscow and the Western world.
The persistence of  Russia’s “resource state” 
(coupled with the recent spike in the demand for 
commodities) appears to have also influenced the 
re-evaluation of  Russia’s understanding of  what 
the country’s relative strategic advantages really are. 
During the previous decade some theorists tried 
to de-emphasize the role and significance of  ter-
ritory as a factor in international relations, while 
arguing that what constitutes a true advantage is 
the mastering of  high technology and information. 
But now, with the growing global hunger for gas, 
oil, water, food, and all sorts of  natural resources, 
the thesis that “the (territorial) size matters” seems 
to be back in vogue again. A country’s land—and 
all the riches that might be hidden in its subsoil—
came to be seen as a valuable asset. A number of  
prominent Russian political thinkers (such as, for 
example, Sergei Karaganov) contend that these 
days territory should be viewed as a source of  
strength rather than of  weakness.11
By the same token, the state of  Russia’s other 
key asset, which during Soviet times used to be 
called, in the wooden communist idiom, the “labor 
resources,” cannot fail to make the Russian elites 
wary. In terms of  power politics, continuous 
shrinking of  Russia’s human stock clearly presents 
a serious strategic problem. But this appears to 
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be a chronic dilemma that Russia has been strug-
gling to adapt to throughout its history: limitless 
expanses, limited population. The larger the coun-
try, the longer its borders, the more difficult it is 
to defend them with meager human resources at 
hand—the stronger the sense of  vulnerability and 
the more acute the threat perception. It is precisely 
this dilemma that, after all, gave rise to the devel-
opment of  societal relations which made Russia’s 
socio-political system distinct vis-à-vis the other 
European Great Powers.
Understanding Russia’s interests
So what does post-Soviet Russia actually want? 
At this point any honest analyst would have to 
concede that Moscow’s interests are not easily dis-
cernible and rationalized. The tiny group of  top 
policymakers (the self-styled “ruling elite”) that 
craft the country’s foreign policy is not completely 
free in making their choices from the interests of  
broader elite strata—the upper echelons of  state 
bureaucracy and the “titans” of  big (mostly state-
controlled) business. The divergence of  interests 
and perspectives within Russian ruling circles feeds 
the foreign policy debate on the more specific 
issues that go beyond what appears to be a broad 
general consensus at the heart of  which is the 
assertion of  Russia’s status as an independent great 
power and the recognition of  the desirability of  
securing favorable external conditions for further 
growth. The broadest common interest uniting all 
segments of  the elite is securing and perpetuating 
the elite’s dominant position within the Russian 
political system.
The study of  Russian interests is particularly chal-
lenging given the fact that the line between what 
is generally understood as national interests and the 
group interests is completely blurred in Russia. This 
situation of  opacity is generated by the very char-
acter of  the present-day Russian elite. The Kremlin 
ruling group represents a specific blend of  political 
and economic power—vlastesobstvennost’, to use the 
Russian neologism. But this symbiosis of  politics 
and business—the so-called Russia Inc.—creates 
the situation in which the state has virtually no 
autonomy from the economic interests of  the indi-
viduals who run it. As the major Russian business 
groups have long been engaged in the aggressive 
expansion in post-Soviet Eurasia and beyond, the 
task of  distinguishing between Moscow’s foreign-
policy moves driven by ostensibly legitimate “vital 
national interests” and those driven by the naked 
pursuit of  profit becomes especially daunting.
Against this background, Russian overall stance 
is best described by the schizophrenic formula: 
“achieving rapprochement with the West while 
keeping aloof  of  the West.” In practical terms, 
the Russian elite’s interests look equally ambigu-
ous. On the one hand, they seek their “personal” 
integration into the Western world. After all, it is 
where the Russian “rich and famous” keep their 
money, second homes, and often their families as 
well. Furthermore, the Kremlin official propaganda 
notwithstanding, Western countries are regarded in 
Russia—both at the elite and mass public level—as 
highly developed, affluent and attractive nations, 
whose friendship it is worth seeking for both mate-
rial and symbolic reasons. In a word, the Russian 
elite want to be perceived in the West as “their own 
kind.”
On the other hand, however, the Russians seemed 
to have realized the principled incompatibility of  
patrimonial authoritarianism and liberal democracy 
earlier than did their Western counterparts. But, 
since the impossibility of  integration either into 
or with the West cannot, for obvious reasons, be 
ideologically explained within Russian society in 
any meaningful way, the Russian elite has set forth 
the thesis that Russia is going to engage with the 
West only on its own terms. In practice, this basically 
means two things.
First, the Russian elite appears to insist on the 
selective approach to the values of  (European) 
modernity that is justified by the references to 
Russia’s “uniqueness” and to the “unsuitability” for 
it of  the Western liberal model due to the country’s 
“ specific historical path.” At the conceptual level, 
this is reflected in the symbolic elevation of  the 
notion of  suverenitet (sovereignty). In domestic 
politics, the interpretation of  suverenitet boils down 
to the Russian elite’s opting for: the market econ-
omy, but of  a kind that is controlled by the state 
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(bureaucracy) and characterized by the proliferation 
of  a number of  clearly non-market practices; the 
legal dualism—the existence of  the “white” and 
“grey” legal zones and the deployment of  so-called 
selective justice; the top-down structuring of  the 
society (the proverbial vertikal’ vlasti) and the lack 
of  public oversight over state bureaucracy; the 
“phony democracy” that is devoid of  genuine politi-
cal pluralism.
Second, for Russia, interacting with the West on its 
own terms involves Moscow’s claim to the status 
of  derzhava (great power) and demand to be treated 
as an equal to the other world centers of  power. 
Immediately following the collapse of  the Soviet 
Union, Russia declared itself  legal successor to the 
defunct Soviet state, which presupposed, among 
other things, the restoration of  Russia’s dominant 
geopolitical role in Eurasia. Arguably, Russian 
leadership in the post-Soviet lands has remained, 
for a while, an auxiliary project subordinate to 
the country’s officially stated main ambition—the 
integration into the “civilized world.” But as the 
integration with the West has proved increasingly 
impractical, the Russian policy elite advanced an 
updated vision of  the global order which is encap-
sulated in the concept of  multipolarity. In the 21st 
century, this concept holds, U. S. unipolar moment 
has ended—mainly due to America’s drastically 
reduced influence as a result of  an “imperial 
overstretch” (caused by the Iraq debacle and the 
Afghanistan quagmire), the rise of  China and India, 
and, last but not least, the rebirth of  the Russian 
power. Thus, in the new multipolar global system 
Russia is destined to be one of  the principal poles 
acting as a major independent player in the inter-
national arena and a natural center of  gravity for 
other ex-Soviet countries.
Note that the final parting with “Westernizing illu-
sions” neatly coincided with Russia’s acquiring very 
significant financial resources due to the energy 
revenues windfall. By about the same time (mid-
2000s) Russia has fully restored its sovereignty and 
secured strategic independence having paid down 
all its debts to Western creditors. As they have got-
ten the means to pursue the more muscular policies 
that befit a true great power and rid themselves of  
the “false ambition” of  making Russia a part of  
the Western world, Russian rulers have focused on 
what is closer to home—the “gathering of  post-
Soviet lands.”
The difficulties of the post-imperial 
readjustment
For Russia, however, to integrate the former impe-
rial borderlands around Moscow is easier said 
than done. There appear to be several powerful 
constraints that hinder Russia’s integrationist drive. 
First, while some Russian policymakers constantly 
invoke the EU template, the experience of  Euro-
pean integration is hardly relevant for post-Soviet 
lands where Russia dwarfs all other potential part-
ners. The dramatic difference in size, economic 
potential and military might between Russia and 
other ex-Soviet republics makes Russia, on the 
one hand, a “natural leader” in the region, but, on 
the other hand, allows for just one viable integra-
tion scenario, namely the restoration of  Russian 
hegemony. It is precisely this scenario that was 
advanced by Anatoly Chubais in his vision of  
“Russia as a liberal empire.”12 Needless to say, such 
a vision made all Russia’s neighbors wary and sus-
picious of  Moscow’s real intentions. The neighbors’ 
wariness becomes all the more acute as Russian 
policymakers continue championing the idea of  
brazen “national egoism.” Clearly, the latter is a 
very poor conceptual underpinning of  any inte-
grationist policy which, by contrast, would put a 
special premium on the notions of  accommodation 
and compromise.
The second constraint appears to stem from the 
very nature of  Russia’s and most of  its ex-Soviet 
neighbors’ socio-political systems. Seeking to 
preserve the strategic environment that would be 
most conducive for the perpetuation of  political 
and economic wellbeing of  Russia’s powers-that-
be, Moscow strives to counter what it perceives as 
the Western attempts at undermining the kindred 
authoritarian regimes in post-Soviet lands. Support-
ing the same-type systems in what Russia’s policy 
elite believes is its geopolitical sphere of  influence 
is perceived as a sine qua non for this elite’s ultimate 
long-term survival. But, ironically, it is precisely 
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the policy of  propping up the post-Soviet authori-
tarian rulers that puts a brake on any potential 
integration process: authoritarian power is indivis-
ible; it cannot be transferred or delegated to any 
supra-national bodies. Nothing illustrates this better 
than the uneasy relationship between the two seem-
ingly “brotherly” regimes—authoritarian Russia 
and authoritarian Belarus which technically even 
formed a “unified state.” Moscow’s vision of  the 
two countries’ “integration” is unacceptable for the 
Belarusian leader, as such a scenario will turn him 
into a governor of  yet another Russian province. 
Russia’s persistent attempts to impose its political 
will by ramping up pressure on Minsk—usually 
through the deployment of  its energy and trade 
leverage—invariably leads to the escalation in bilat-
eral relations and sets the Belarusian leadership on 
a course of  geopolitical maneuvering.
The deficit of normative power
Finally, there is a question of  an ideational dimen-
sion of  integration. True, of  late, Russia seeks to 
cast itself  as a potential “norm-maker,” pretending 
to act as a normative counterweight to the EU. “If  
we believe that the institutions of  Western democ-
racy cannot be fully accepted in post-Soviet East-
ern Europe,” some Kremlin-connected ideologues 
argue, “why can’t we discuss this openly?”13 But, 
remarkably, these political thinkers never go into 
details as to what exactly the alternative values and 
institutions might be. There seems to be a good 
reason for such a reluctance to be specific: the Rus-
sian elite, which is unable to even come up with a 
proper term of  its own that would characterize its 
distinct political system, is definitely in no position 
to throw a gauntlet to Europe’s democratic ideal. 
As one Russian wit has put it, the slogan “For the 
world-wide victory of  phony democracy!” doesn’t 
sound terribly inspiring.14
That’s how Russia finds itself  trapped in what I 
call the attraction-assertion dilemma. Despite the 
considerable amount of  soft power that Russia still 
possesses in post-Soviet lands (the Russian lan-
guage as the communications medium across the 
ex-Soviet territories, the attractiveness of  Russian 
highbrow and popular culture, the spiritual author-
ity of  the Russian Orthodox Church, etc.),15 the 
constraints discussed above prevent it from acting 
as a powerful magnet able to integrate the region 
around itself. But, absent the power of  attraction, 
Moscow has to resort to the power of  assertion, or, 
in Dmitry Trenin’s felicitous phrase, instead of  love 
it offers its neighbors tough love.16 Thus Russia’s 
relations with the same-type regimes in Eurasia 
can only take the shape of  a relationship between 
hegemon and satellite states. As Russia’s neigh-
bors don’t deem such a prospect to be particularly 
attractive, they opt for the most natural kind of  
behavior under the circumstances: they all have 
become the classical “balancers.”
Conclusion
It is precisely the belated realization that the persis-
tence of  the current political and economic system 
in Russia makes the integration of  the country with 
the Western institutions unfeasible, coupled with 
the inability to find a mutually acceptable modus 
operandi that chronically sours the relationship 
between Moscow and the Western world. So what 
appears, at the first glance, to be a foreign policy 
problem might well be rooted in the realm of  Rus-
sian domestic politics. Moscow’s prickly reaction 
to any prospect of  EU and/or NATO eastern 
enlargement (or to whatever Western activism in 
the new Eastern Europe) illustrates the intimate 
link between the “foreign” and the “domestic.” 
What Moscow claims to be primarily a security 
issue is rather a problem stemming from Russia’s 
inability to fully embrace (European) modernity 
and complete the construction of  modern pol-
ity—a law-governed state that upholds political and 
economic pluralism.
There is no denial that at the moment “Russia is 
back.” The country did rebound and revived itself  
after nearly hitting the rock bottom in the 1990s, 
thus proving right those rare contrarians who 
almost two decades ago presciently argued that 
Russia’s revival was inevitable. But will the Rus-
sian elites have their wish—to have Russia’s great 
power status fully legitimized? Will post-Soviet 
Russia be finally recognized as being on a par with 
the world’s other great powers? Some leading 
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Russian analysts do believe that now Russia has a 
golden opportunity for pursuing a very successful 
foreign policy.17 Russia’s main Western geopolitical 
competitors (the U. S. and the EU) are significantly 
weakened, they argue, and probably for the first 
time in the country’s history there is no serious 
external threat worth mentioning. More important, 
however, it turned out that the very aspects of  the 
Russian conduct that seemed outdated and belong-
ing to the 19th century diplomatic toolkit (such 
as the reliance on hard power, realist geopolitics, 
privileging national over international and cham-
pioning the enhanced role of  the state) are, in fact, 
“post-modern” and better suited to the realities of  
the 21st century as we are witnessing the process 
of  the “renationalization of  international relations” 
with national states playing a more prominent role 
worldwide. The bottom line, this argument con-
tends, is that in today’s “new old world” Russia’s 
seemingly old-fashioned policy turns out to be 
precisely what the doctor ordered: as a result, Rus-
sia proves to be a more effective international actor 
that is able to punch above its weight.
Yet there is an alternative argument: until Russia 
becomes a truly modern state, its socio-political sys-
tem (as well as its “national interests”) is unlikely 
to be regarded as fully legitimate. Some astute 
political thinkers (such as, for example, Iver Neu-
mann) have argued that the key problem Russia is 
facing in its quest for recognition is in fact a social 
one.18 Briefly, it boils down to the incompatibility 
between the Russian and European regime types 
and, specifically, between the ways they structure 
the relationship between state and society. So long 
as the societal differences between Russia and the 
other (Western) great powers continue to persist, 
Russia will be regarded as lacking social power to 
be perceived by the West as “its own kind” thus 
perpetuating mutual suspicions and mistrust that 
chronically haunted the relationship between Russia 
and its Western neighbors.
The EU’s and Russia’s diverging approaches toward 
internal governance seriously impact on the bilat-
eral relationship. To be sure, the latter is character-
ized by the massive interdependence as well as by 
the multidimensional cooperation. Yet the EU and 
Russia are also vigorously competing, not least in 
their shared neighborhood. Both actors appear to 
be exercising normative and structural power—
seeking to control, to varying degrees, the realms 
of  security, finances, and ideas in the region—, 
in order to shape their strategic environment.19 
Although Moscow and Brussels seem to recognize 
the advantages that their constructive interaction in 
the “in-between Europe” could provide to better 
confront the challenges emanating from the region, 
for the foreseeable future, it is competition that is 
the name of  the game.20
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